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THE SAFE HARBOR OF 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1): THE END
OF ENFORCEABLE BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS IN
DRUG DISCOVERY?

I. INTRODUCTION

The fundamental protection of intellectual property in the
pharmaceutical and biotechnological industries is the patent. The
ease of reverse-engineering a drug makes trade secret protection
inapposite, leaving the inventor of a new drug with the limited
monopoly of a patent. The twenty-year life of a patent from the
time of application is a very short window within which a drugmaker may recoup its research and development costs, when preclinical and clinical testing are taken into account. In fact, the
approval process by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
for a new drug can take so long that Congress saw fit to grant an
extension to the affected patent's term.1 Even with the extension,
some estimate that pharmaceutical companies on average have
three to seven years of exclusivity under the patent before the entry of low-cost generic equivalents.2
Federal law grants the owner of a patent the right to sue for infringement any party who practices the patented invention without the owner's approval. Yet several exceptions exist, in federal
statutory law and the common law, that permit infringers to proceed without compensating the patentee. In 1984, Congress
passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act ("Hatch-Waxman Act"),3 which has two major provisions. The
first extends the term of the patent to allow for the length of time
needed for FDA approval. The second provision assists in the
1. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (j), (1) (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271,
282 (2000)).
2. See MARTIN A. VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA
AND PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 103 (2005).

3.
4.

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act.
See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. I, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
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preparation and development of low-cost generic drugs, which
Congress recognized as having significant public value. 5 Specifically, Congress passed 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or
sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention . .. solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs .... 6

Although Congress may have intended for § 271(e)(1) to make
the development of generic drugs easier,7 the statute is devoid of
any limitation to such drugs.' In fact, the nonspecific phrases "a
patented invention" and "a Federal law" have allowed a significant expansion of the infringement exemption beyond what Congress may have intended. Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that
Congress's intent does not supplant the actual words of the statute even if the broad language employed may have detrimental
consequences to patent holders in the United States. '
As more cases are handed down in light of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of § 271(e)(1), it has become increasingly clear that
biotechnological and pharmaceutical patents involved in drug
discovery are at risk of becoming unenforceable. Congress's use of
broad language has allowed drug researchers to avoid paying
patentees for the use of their patents involved in drug research,
and it may not be long before infringement without penalty begins to threaten innovation within the industry.
Part II of this comment traces the development of case law
leading up to § 271(e)(1) and the passage of § 271(e)(1). Part III
delineates the major cases of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit ("CAFC") and the Supreme Court that interpret the
breadth and applicability of § 271(e)(1). Part IV discusses the

2648.
5. See id. at 14, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 2647.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. II at 8 reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686 (intending safe harbor for "a limited amount of testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute.").
8. Section 271(e)(1) makes no specific reference to generic drugs or Abbreviated New
Drug Applications, only explicitly referencing "a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs... ." 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
9. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005); Eli Lilly
& Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665-69 (1990).
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typical drug discovery process and the holding in Merck KGaA v.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,' ° concerning when the § 271(e)(1) infringement exemption begins." Part IV also explores the questions left unanswered by recent Supreme Court rulings and drug
researchers' possible reactions to the changes. Finally, the Conclusion in Part V contemplates the future of the pharmaceutical
and biotechnological industries in the absence of Congressional
action to address the current challenges it faces regarding the §
271(e)(1) safe harbor.

II. ROCHE V. BOLAR

AND THE CREATION OF

§ 271(e)(1)

Since the early days of the judicial development of the patent
system in the United States, exemptions to the patentee's "right
to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling
the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States" have existed.' The CAFC artificially extended the effective patent term of protection in Roche
Products,Inc. v. Bolar PharmaceuticalCo. " The issue in Roche v.
Bolar involved the development of a generic version of a patented
drug prior to the expiration of the patent term.' 4 Roche was the
assignee of U.S. Patent No. 3,299,053 ('053 patent"), 5 which
taught flurazepam hydrochloride ("flurazepam HCI"), a benzodiazepine that constituted the active ingredient in Roche's highly
successful sleeping pill, Dalmane. 16 Bolar Pharmaceuticals
wanted to enter the market with a generic form of Dalmane before its competitors, but was concerned with the length of time
required to obtain approval from the FDA.' 7 Under the approval
scheme for a generic drug at that time, a generic drug company
must submit a New Drug Application ("NDA"). The NDA required
submission of safety information, such as "stability data, dissolution rates, bioequivalency studies, and blood serum studies," and

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

545 U.S. 193 (2005).
Id. at 202.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000).
733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
See id. at 860.
U.S. Patent No. 3,299,053 (filed Feb. 11, 1964) (issued Jan. 17, 1967).
Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d at 860.
Id.
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took approximately two years to achieve FDA approval.' 8 About
six months prior to the '053 patent's expiration date,' 9 Bolar obtained the active ingredient flurazepam HCl from "a foreign
manufacturer not subject to United States patent law"2 ° and berequired experimentation to develop a generic
gan conducting the 21
version of the drug.
Bolar contended that due to the length of time required for generic drug approval, forbidding generic drug development prior to
patent expiration, even for "limited pre-expiration preparation for
post-expiration entry into the market," amounted to a de facto
patent monopoly extension. Thus, Bolar attempted to circumvent
Roche's Dalmane patent. 22 The district court agreed with Bolar,
holding that its use of flurazepam HCl was de minimus and "the
law does not concern itself with small matters."23 And Bolar's use
was not "an experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere
amusement." 24 Instead, the court found that Bolar's activities
represented merely "a violation of the principle of [Roche's] monopoly" and failed to cause any substantial harm to Roche prior to
the expiration of the '053 patent.2 5
The CAFC reversed the case on appeal, holding that Roche had
the right to exclude a competitor from using its patented drug in
efforts to supply information for an NDA to the FDA.26 The CAFC
explained that the experimental use defense 27 could not be extended so far as to allow competitors to use the patented inven28
tion for applications with an underlying commercial motive. Al-

18.

Id.

19. The '053 patent expired January 17, 1984. Id.
20. Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 572 F. Supp. 255, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
21.

Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d at 860.

22. Roche v. Bolar, 572 F. Supp. at 257.
23. Id. at 258.
24. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279).
25. Roche v. Bolar, 572 F. Supp. at 258.
26. See Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d at 863, 867 ("[U]nlicensed experiments conducted
with a view to the adaption of the patented invention to the experimentor's business is a
violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude others from using his patented invention.").
27. The experimental use defense is a common law defense against infringement for
non-commercial use. For a full description of the experimental use defense and its recent
changes, see Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1360-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
28. Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d at 863 ("We cannot construe the experimental use rule so
broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of 'scientific inquiry,' when

20071

BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS

1029

though a de facto extension of a patent's term would result in limiting such a use, the statutes regarding patent infringement and
NDA submissions to the FDA did not provide any flexibility for
the length of time required for generic drug approval. In light of
this obvious discrepancy, the CAFC invited Congress to act in order to address the problems highlighted in this case with the development of generic drugs, and opted not to "rewrite the patent
laws here."2 9
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984,30 also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, was Congress's
attempt to alleviate the problems highlighted in Roche v. Bolar,
namely, "two distortions to the normal 'patent term produced by
the requirement that certain products must receive premarket
regulatory approval."'3 1 First, the Hatch-Waxman Act created a
patent term adjustment for the length of time that a patentee of a
drug is barred from commercially marketing the drug prior to
FDA approval.3 2 This was deemed warranted in light of the typical seven to thirteen year approval time required to bring a drug
candidate to market.3 3 Second, the Hatch-Waxman Act tried to
facilitate the development of generic versions of prescription
drugs by granting generic drug companies the right to use patas soon
ented drugs in order to bring generic versions to 3 market
4
as possible after the expiration of the drug patent.
The imprecise language Congress used to embody its intent to
convey generic drug companies an exemption for the infringement
of drug patents in pursuit of FDA approval of generic drugs provides the basis for all of the cases and commentary to follow.
Congress specifically stated in the legislative history of the

that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.").
29. Id. at 865. The CAFC concluded by restating the oft used phrase from Sony v.
Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984), "it is not our job to apply laws that have not
yet been written."
30. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (j), (1) (2000); 35
U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)).
31.

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MAN-

UAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2750 (8th ed. rev. 2006) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990)).
32. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. I, at 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2647-48.
33. SUBCOMM. ON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, 96TH CONG., THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S PROCESS FOR
APPROVING NEW DRUGS, 18 (Comm. Print 1980).

34.

H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. I, at 14-15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 2647-48.
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Hatch-Waxman Act that it wanted to provide "a limited amount
of testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute."35 However, the statute's language granting the exemption, as written, is sweepingly broad in
scope:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or
sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product . . . ) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. 36

The question of whether the statutory language or legislative
history controls the interpretation of the statute was decided in
two recent Supreme Court cases, but questions still remain as to
how expansive the exemption of § 271(e)(1) actually is.
III. JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF THE § 271(e)(1) SAFE HARBOR

A. Eli Lilly v. Medtronic
The specific issue concerning the breadth of the "safe harbor"
exemption of § 271(e)(1) arose in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic
Inc. " Dr. Michael Mirowski held two patents on the development
of an internally implanted cardiac defibrillator capable of discharging electric shocks, which could be used to treat two types of
cardiac arrhythmias, ventricular tachycardia or ventricular fibrillation.3" Medtronic, one of the leading manufacturers of cardiac
pacemakers, was originally assigned Mirowski's patents, but declined to commercially develop the implantable defibrillator.3 9
Mirowski then exclusively assigned his patents to Eli Lilly, who

35. Id. pt. II, at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2692; see also Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
37. 496 U.S. 661, 663-64 (1990).
38. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1439, 1440 (E.D. Pa.
1988). Ventricular tachycardia means "relatively rapid heart action." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1199 (10th ed. 1993) [hereinafter MERRIAM-WEBSTER]. Ventricular fibrillation means "very rapid irregular contractions of the muscle fibers of the heart
resulting in a lack of synchronism between heartbeat and pulse." Id. at 432.
39. Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.
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obtained FDA approval for the medical device described in Mirowski's patents.4" Medtronic later decided to enter the implantable defibrillator market and unsuccessfully attempted to reacquire the rights to Mirowski's patent.4 ' After a failed attempt to
invalidate Eli Lilly's patents through reexamination in the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), Medtronic
developed an improved implantable device, combining the defibrillator with a conventional pacemaker, creating a single unit
capable of treating fibrillation, tachycardia, and bradycardia.4 2
Medtronic built several of the improved models and installed
them in patients in Canada prior to Eli Lilly's patent infringement suit.43
At trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Medtronic made a motion for summary
judgment, alleging its activity infringing upon Eli Lilly's patent
was exempted by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) because it was "reasonably
related to the development and submission of information" to the
FDA under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA")"
for medical devices.4 5 Finding § 271(e)(1) inapplicable to medical
devices, 46 the court noted that the language of the statute covered
"Federal law which regulates ... drugs,"47 despite Medtronic's objection that the language "describes the type of law, not the type
of patented invention."4" With both parties admitting this was a
case of first impression for any court in the country, the court
found the legislative history most persuasive, holding that the
§ 271(e)(1) exemption only applied to drugs, denying the motion
for summary judgment.4 9 The jury subsequently found that Medtronic had willfully infringed upon Eli Lilly's patents for defibrillators, and the court issued an injunction preventing Medtronic
from leveraging "its current strength in the pacemaker industry
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. Bradycardia means "relatively slow heart action." MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 38, at 137.
43. Eli Lilly v.Medtronic, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.
44. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (2000).
45. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1760, 1761 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
46. See id. at 1761-62.
47. Id. at 1762 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (emphasis added)).
48. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 405 (Fed. Cir. 1989), affd 496 U.S.
661 (1990).
49. See Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762.
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to dominate the market involving devices for treating tachycardia
and fibrillation."' 50
Medtronic brought an interlocutory appeal from the permanent
injunction to the CAFC, which reversed and remanded the case.
In its opinion, the court commented that both parties "put forth
equally plausible interpretations of section 271(e)(1), which to
[this court] means the language is fraught with ambiguity."5 ' The
CAFC, however, relied on a different segment of the legislative
history where "Congress explicitly stated: 'The provisions of section 202 of the bill [i.e., the amendment of Title 35 adding section
271(e)] have the net effect of reversing the holding of the court in
Roche.'' 2 The CAFC reiterated its holding in Roche v. Bolar:
While the claimed matter in Roche was limited to a drug product,
the holding of that case was not so limited. The holding provided an
interpretation of the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) without regard to
what particular goods might be involved. Specifically, the court decided that the unlicensed use of a patented invention for testing
and investigation, even though strictly related to obtaining FDA
approval for a substitute, was an infringement under 35 U.S.C. §
271(a).53

The CAFC concluded that "section 271(e)(1) allows a party to
make, use, or sell any type of 'patented invention' if 'solely' for the
5 4
restricted uses stated therein."
On certiorari the Supreme Court reiterated that the question
before it was whether the terminal language of § 271(e)(1),55 specifically "a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or
sale of drugs, " " was determinative as to whether the exemption
found in § 271(e)(1) applied only to the submission of information
to the FDA under an Abbreviated New Drug Application
("ANDA") for generic drugs5 7 or if the language could be extended
to include information submitted for premarket approval for

50. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1439, 1445 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
51. Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 872 F.2d at 405.
52. Id. at 406 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. II., at 27
(1984) reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2711).

53. Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 872 F.2d at 406.
54.

Id.

55. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1990).
56. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
57.

21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000).
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medical devices.5" The Court held that because the FDCA regulates both drugs and medical devices, the § 271(e)(1) exemption
applies in both instances.59
In the majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia focused on the
question of whether the language of the § 271(e)(1) exemption
strictly limited its application to patented drugs. The majority indicated that none of Eli Lilly, Medtronic, or even the CAFC's references to the legislative history were necessary in light of the
entirety of the Hatch-Waxman Act.6 0 The Court reasoned that
Congress chose to create a patent term extension to offset the
length of time required for premarket approval for products required to be submitted under the FDCA or other Federal law and
the § 271(e)(1) exemption to offset this monopoly expansion.6 1
Through this give-and-take, the extension and infringement exclusion should be read in concert.6 2 The Court found especially
enlightening the exclusion from the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor "a new
animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are
used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of
March 4, 1913). " 63 Since these particular inventions were explicitly excluded from the patent term extension, this suggested to
the Court that any invention that would qualify for patent term
extension, including medical devices,64 food additives, 65 color additives, 66 new drugs,6 7 antibiotic drugs,6" and human biological
products,6 9 would concurrently be eligible for the § 271(e)(1) safe
harbor. °
The Court also noted that Congress approached the issue of
generic drug development separately from § 271(e)(1). Referring
to § 271(e)(2), which relates to the filing of an ANDA, the Court
stated that the submission of an ANDA is a specific type of in-

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

21 U.S.C. § 360e(b) (2000).
See Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 496 U.S. at 666-69.
See id. at 669.
See id. at 672-73.
See id.
See id. at 673 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)).
See 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2000).
21 U.S.C. § 348 (2000).
21 U.S.C. § 379e (2000).
21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
21 U.S.C. § 357 (2000) (repealed 1997).
42 U.S.C. § 262 (2000).
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 673-74 (1990).
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fringement that, by itself, only pertains to these types of drug
patent applications.7" In order to file the ANDA, a generic drug
producer must possess the requisite safety and efficacy information, and although Congress explicitly chose to codify the ANDA
filing as a patent infringing act,72 it exempted the procurement of
biological information from infringement. The Court, however, affirmed the CAFC's finding that the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption applied to any patented invention 73 and stated that no statutory interpretation "can transform § 271(e)(1) into an elegant
' 74
piece of statutory draftsmanship.
The dissent, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy and joined by
Justice Byron White, focused on the nature of the infringement
and argued that the § 271(e)(1) exemption was inapplicable to
medical devices.7 5 Justice Kennedy first opined, "When § 271(e)(1)
speaks of a law which regulates drugs, I think that it does not refer to particular enactments or implicate the regulation of anything other than drugs."7 6 The dissent continued by distinguishing the harm to a drug patent holder whose patent is infringed by
generic drug makers conducting safety and efficacy experiments
from the harm experienced by Eli Lilly in the case at bar.7 7 For
an ANDA submission, the de minimus infringement experienced
by the drug patentee is strictly noncommercial, with the generic
manufacturer generating sales only after expiration of the patent
and FDA approval.78 In the case of Medtronic's infringement, the
infringing defibrillators were sold to the patients, which financially infringed Eli Lilly's patent monopoly by depriving it of a
sale of its patented product.79 However, the dissent did concede
that "Congress could have specified [the safe harbor exemption]
in a clearer manner."8 °

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 678.
See id. at 676-78.
See id. at 669.
Id. at 679.
See id. at 679-80 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id. at 682 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id. at 682 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id. at 682-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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B. Merck v. Integra
The Supreme Court took advantage of the case presented in
1 to further expand the safe harbor exemption of
Merck v. Integra"
§ 271(e)(1). 2 Integra Lifesciences was the assignee of several patents 3 pertaining to the use of the "RGD" peptide 4 in modulating
cell adhesion.8" Specifically, it was known that living mammalian
cells were able to stick to one another by a specific interaction between two proteins found on the surface of cells 6 in a manner
reminiscent of Velcro. The patent inventors, Drs. Ruoslahti and
Pierschbacher,17 determined that half of the cell adhesion process
was caused by a simple three amino acid peptide sequence found
in one of the proteins, namely the RGD peptide."8 By introducing
the RGD peptide into a solution of cells adhered to one another,
the peptide, by competing with the native cell-surface protein,

81. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 197 (2005).
82. See id. at 197; see also Brendan M. O'Malley, Note, Merck v. Integra and Its Aftermath: A Safe Harborfor the Commercial Use of Biotechnology Research Tools?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 739, 752 (2006) ("If Justice Scalia thrust the Court's bayonet into
the belly of § 271(e)(1) in Lilly, he pulled out its viscera in Merck v. Integra.").
83. U.S. Patent Nos. 5,695,997 (filed June 2, 1995) ("'997 Patent"); 4,988,621 (filed
Dec. 10, 1987) ("'621 Patent"); 4,789,734 (filed Aug. 6, 1985) ("'734 Patent"); 4,792,525
(filed June 17, 1985) ("'525 Patent"); 4,879,237 (filed May 24, 1985) ("'237 Patent").
84. A "peptide" is defined as a chain of amino acids linked together. For short peptides, such as Integra's RGD tripeptide, the amino acid sequence is denoted by a shorthand code with letters that stand for individual amino acids. For example, "R" stands for
Arginine, "G" stands for Glycine, and "D" stands for Aspartic Acid. It should also be clarified that both peptides and proteins are composed of a chains of amino acids, yet the difference between them is based upon the length of the chain. Although the demarcation
between peptide and protein has been suggested to be at 50 amino acids, the arbitrary line
is very imprecise near this length and depends upon the specific area of research. The
terms are frequently interchanged. Suffice it to say that amino acid chains of less than a
few dozen amino acids are probably referred to as peptides, and chains of hundreds, thousands, or tens of thousands of amino acids are clearly proteins. Peptides employed biologically are frequently used as messengers, whereas proteins fall into many diverse classes of
use, such as receptors, enzymes (proteins that catalyze chemical reactions), and others.
85. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 862-63 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
86. Id., see also, '997 Patent, '621 Patent, '734 Patent, '525 Patent, '237 Patent.
87. The two inventors were researchers at the Burnham Institute at the time of the
invention. They licensed their patents to Telios Pharmaceuticals, which they founded in
June of 1987. See Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 389070. Telios spent over $150 million
attempting to commercially develop the RGD peptide before declaring bankruptcy, see id.
at 20, eventually selling the rights to the RGD peptide patents to Integra in April of 1995,
see id., Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, No. 96CV1307-B(AJB), LEXIS 20725,
at *7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2004).
88. See '997 Patent, '621 Patent, '734 Patent, '525 Patent, '237 Patent.
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would block all of the adhesion sites and cause the cells to stop
sticking to one another.8 9 The inventors envisioned their discovery of the RGD peptide could be used to trick cells in the body
into adhering to things they would not normally stick to, such as
artificial joints, by attaching the RGD peptide to the surface of
the prosthesis, allowing faster integration into the body.9 °
Dr. David Cheresh 9 ' of The Scripps Research Institute
("Scripps") was conducting research on fighting cancer by inhibiting the formation of new blood vessels in the body, a process
known as angiogenesis.9 2 Because it was known that the rapid
growth in solid cancerous tumors was supported by the development of new blood vessels to supply nutrients to the tumors, it
was postulated that inhibiting the formation of new blood vessels
might lead to the starvation and death of the cancerous tumor.9 3
Dr. Cheresh was investigating a particular type of receptor, an
integrin, known to be involved in the normal process of wound repair, which also includes the development of new blood vessels
(angiogenesis) to replace damaged veins, arteries, and capillaries.9 4 By using an antibody capable of specifically binding to
the a 03 integrin, Dr. Cheresh was able to halt angiogenesis in a
wound healing simulation.9 5 Applying the same antibody to cancerous tumors in the laboratory led to dramatic losses in tumor
size and cancer cell death due to inhibition of angiogenesis.9 6
Merck KGaA, who had funded Dr. Cheresh's research since
1988, supplied Cheresh's laboratory with a tetrapeptide,

89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Currently Dr. Cheresh is a Professor of Pathology at the Moores Cancer Center,
University of California, San Diego. University of California, San Diego Medical Center,
Moores Cancer Center, Research/Clinical Summary, http://cancer.ucsd.edu/summaries/d
cheresh.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
92. See generally Peter C. Brooks et al., Integrin ai 3 Antagonists Promote Tumor Regression by Inducing Apoptosis of Angiogenic Blood Vessels, 79 CELL 1157 (1994) [hereinafter Brooks et al.]; Peter C. Brooks, Richard A. F. Clark, & David A. Cheresh, Requirement of Vascular Integrin a,3 3 for Angiogenesis, 264 SCIENCE 569 (1994).
93. See Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 1157; Brooks, Clark & Cheresh, supra note 92
at 569-70.
94. See Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 1157; Brooks, Clark & Cheresh, supra note 92
at 570.
95. See Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 1157, 1161; Brooks, Clark & Cheresh, supra
note 92, at 571.
96. Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 1161; Brooks, Clark & Cheresh, supra note 92, at
571.
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cRDPV,97 where the R and V had been joined together to form a
closed loop or "cyclic" tetrapeptide, to test for inhibition of angiogenesis." This cyclic tetrapeptide was very effective at suppressing tumor growth by cessation of angiogenesis and presented
Cheresh, Scripps, and Merck with a viable drug lead. Based on
these preliminary results, the three parties penned an agreement
wherein Merck agreed to fund Scripps over the next three years
to develop a drug suitable for submission to the FDA as an Investigational New Drug ("IND") application.9 9 Per the agreement,
Dr. Cheresh was to determine "the histopathology, toxicology, circulation, diffusion, and half-life of the peptides in the bloodstream" in animals. 100 In 1997, experimentation with derivatives
of cRDPV led to the discovery of EMD 121974, a derivative of
cRDPV that was deemed to be the best candidate for clinical development due to its superior activity in suppressing angiogenesis
0 '
and stability during in vivo preclinical testing."
Integra approached Merck to obtain a license for use of the
RGD tripeptide segment after learning of Merck's research and
discovering that Merck's lead compound, cRDPV, was covered by
patents that were owned by Integra.10 2 When negotiations ended
with Merck refusing to obtain a license, Integra brought suit
against Merck, Scripps, and Dr. Cheresh for patent infringement.' 3 At trial, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California ruled the defendant's actions were not
immunized by the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption. 104 The jury
found Cheresh, Scripps, and Merck infringed on Integra's patents
and awarded a reasonable royalty of $15 million.10 5 Following
post-trial motions, the suits against Dr. Cheresh and Scripps
were dismissed0 6 and Merck appealed. 107

97. V stands for Valine, an amino acid, and c stands for cyclic, meaning that both ends
are attached to one another to form a closed loop.
98. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 197 (2005).
99. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 201 (2005).
106. See id.
107. See Integra v. Merck, 331 F.3d at 864.
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A divided panel of judges for the CAFC affirmed in part the decision that Merck's actions did not qualify for the § 271(e)(1) exemption.'
The majority, Judges Randall Rader and Sharon
Prost, held the infringing actions of Scripps and Merck were not
for developing information to submit to the FDA, "but instead
identified the best drug candidate to subject to future clinical
testing under the FDA processes."109 The majority's decision was
contingent upon the use of "solely" in the § 271(e)(1) exemption,
and concluded "[t]he FDA has no interest in the hunt for drugs
that may or may not later undergo clinical testing for FDA approval."110 The CAFC held the link between the actions of
Scripps, Cheresh, and Merck, specifically the use of a patented
drug to assist a competitor to develop a potential drug candidate
of their own, was too remote an activity to qualify for the §
271(e)(1) exemption 1 1 ' and issued a warning against such an expansion:
[E]xpansion of § 271(e)(1) to include the Scripps Merck activities
would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning biotechnology tool patents. After all, patented tools often facilitate general research to identify candidate drugs, as well as downstream
safety-related experiments on those new drugs. Because the downstream clinical testing for FDA approval falls within the safe harbor,
these patented tools would only supply some commercial benefit to
the inventor when applied to general research. Thus, exaggerating §
271(e)(1) out of context would swallow the whole benefit of the Patent Act for some categories of biotechnological inventions. Needless
to say, the 1984 Act was meant to reverse the effects of Roche under
limited circumstances not to deprive entire categories of inventions
of patent protection. 1

The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion, written by Justice
Scalia, holds, "[We think it apparent from the statutory text that
§ 271(e)(1)'s exemption from infringement extends to all uses of
patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development and submission of any information under the FDCA."1 3 The
108. See id. at 872. The CAFC Circuit reversed in part the district court's denial of
Merck's motion for reconsideration of its calculation for a reasonable royalty. See id. at
871-72.
109. Id. at 865.

110. Id. at 866.
111. See id.

112. Id. at 867. This decision is interesting in light of the CAFC's decision in Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Medtronic, where the court specifically held that the holding in Roche v. Bolar was
not limited to drugs. See 872 F.2d 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1989), affd 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
113.

Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005).
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decision not only follows the holding in Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, the
safe harbor applies to "any type of 'patented invention,"'11 4 but the
unanimity of the Court suggests that the language of the statute
will be broadly applied to any activity "reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under" the FDCA." 5
The Supreme Court described several situations when the
§ 271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption would apply. First, the Court
wrote that because the FDA is interested in all information critical to determining the safety of a drug candidate, including preclinical studies, the safe harbor exemption would protect activities involving both in vitro and in vivo studies.1 16 Preclinical
studies can either be in vitro, biochemical assays not in living organisms, or in vivo, assays in living organisms, whether occurring
in bacteria, yeast, plants, or even animals such as mice or chimpanzees. Second, the Court specifically addressed the use of patented compounds in preclinical studies, finding that their use "is
protected under § 271(e)(1) as long as there is a reasonable basis
for believing that the experiments will produce 'the types of information that are relevant to an IND or NDA."'1'17 Third, the
Court noted the fact that information derived from the use of the
patented compounds themselves was omitted from the information submitted to the FDA was not significant because its use was
reasonably related to the development of a new, albeit competing,
drug."' Finally, the Court fixed a point along the drug development process where the acts of infringement would specifically be
protected under § 271(e)(1), stating:
At least where a drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing that
a patented compound may work, through a particular biological process, to produce a particular physiological effect, and uses the compound in research that, if successful, would be appropriate to include
in a submission to the FDA, that use is "reasonably related" to the
and submission of information under . . . Federal
"development
11
law."

114.

Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 872 F.2d at 406.

115. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
116. See Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. at 202, n.6 (2005) ("The Court of Appeals recognized
that information included in an IND would come within § 271(e)(1)'s safe harbor .... Because an IND must be filed before clinical trials may begin, such information would necessarily be developed in preclinical studies.").
117. Id.at 208.
118. See id. at 207.
119. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)).
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C. Recent Cases
Several recent federal district court decisions were decided in a
matter consistent with the view that § 271(e)(1) applies to "all
patented inventions." In 2006, the Northern Division of the District of Maryland dismissed, on the grounds of the § 271(e)(1) exemption, two of Classen Immunotherapies's claims of patent infringement. 120 In the first case, Classen sued Biogen, GlaxoSmithKline ("GSK"), and others for infringing its patent involving
a method of administering and monitoring experimental vaccines
to evaluate their efficacy and safety. 121 Biogen and GSK moved
for dismissal on the grounds of § 271(e)(1), arguing that the FDA
requires monitoring information to be collected for submission to
the FDA. 122 Classen countered that § 271(e)(1) should not apply
in that situation because it was intended to cover generic drugs,
not vaccines that have already been approved by the FDA and are
currently on the market. 123 In granting Biogen and GSK's motion
to dismiss, the district court applied Merck v. Integra and found
because § 271(e)(1) applies to any information to be submitted to
the FDA, including post-approval
studies, the infringing activities
24
1
permissible.
legally
were
Classen lost a similar case to Elan Pharmaceuticals. 12' Elan
conducted additional FDA studies after initial approval determined that Skelaxin was absorbed differently with food than
without.' 2 6 Classen sued Elan, arguing that Elan's experiments
infringed its patents on methods to investigate new uses for existing drugs.127 In granting Elan's motion to dismiss, the district
court reiterated the holding of the Supreme Court, stating that
"there is simply no room in the statute for excluding certain information from the exemption on the basis of the phase of re120. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. King Pharms., Inc., No. WDQ-04-3521, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90806 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen
IDEC, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Md. 2005), appeal dismissed, 178 F. App'x 14 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
121. See Classen v. Biogen, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 453-54.
122. See id.at 455.
123. See id. at 455-56.
124. See id. at 456.
125. See Classen v. King, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90806, at *2. King Pharmaceuticals
purchased the rights to Skelaxin from Elan. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. King
Pharms. Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 451, 453 (D. Md. 2005).
126. See Classen v. King, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 90806, at *3.
127. See id. at *4.
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search in which it is developed or the particular submission in
which it could be included."12
IV. DRUG DISCOVERY AND THE IMPACT OF MERCK V. INTEGRA

Despite the ambiguity of the language in § 271(e)(1), 129 the Supreme Court's holding in Merck v. Integra,3 ' as applied to Merck
and Dr. Cheresh's specific drug discovery activities, actually provides a demarcation that clearly indicates the reach of the safe
harbor exemption. In order to fully comprehend the holding in
Merck v. Integra,"' it is necessary to understand the general
process by which a new drug is discovered, developed, and ultimately submitted to the FDA for approval.
A. Drug Discovery Roadmap
First, defining technical terms properly is critical to understanding how the recent Supreme Court decisions affect drug discovery today. Drug discovery typically begins with basic research
into a particular disease in the hope of identifying an underlying
cause which may be manipulated by a new drug to ameliorate the
targeted disease. This cause might be discovered to be a receptor
on a cell or some biochemical pathway whose existence or significance is realized for the first time. At this stage of basic research,
no drugs have entered the picture because research of this type
only serves as the background for drug discovery by providing the
32
drug target. 1

128. See id. at *7 (quoting Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193,
202 (2005)).
129. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
130. See Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. at 202 (2005).
131. Id.
132. There is a lot of confusion about what exactly constitutes basic research. The author chooses to define "basic research" as research into finding a drug target prior to the
search for a drug lead. Such a definition may be appropriate within the context of this
comment, but the work is hardly basic. In fact, without the challenging, innovative, and
essential research undertaken to understand the cause for a disease, find a drug target, or
understand a cellular signaling pathway, drug discovery would grind to a halt. The most
important thing to remember when working with ambiguous terms like "basic research"
and "research tools" is that the terms must be precisely defined in any discussion, since
the terms are inherently vague and have meanings that differ between scientific fields or
even scientists within a given field. For an example of such confusion, see Justice Scalia's
exchange with the Assistant to the Solicitor General during oral arguments in Merck v.

1042

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1025

Basic research culminates in the creation of an assay with
which potential drug targets may be screened for efficacy in relieving the disease of interest. Biologists will have created a drug
screening assay that involves the drug target, with the assay providing some type of measurable response that correlates to the
desired effect in the diseased state. If the target is a receptor,
perhaps the assay will be able to demonstrate when the normal
operating state of the receptor has been interrupted. In simpler
assays, such as assays looking for antibiotics or anticancer
agents, the assay would be able to look for the killing of bacteria
or cancer cells, respectively, without regard to the manner by
which the drugs will achieve the desired response.
Once the screening assay has been developed during basic research, drug discovery moves into the lead discovery phase. The
purpose of the lead discovery stage is to apply the screening assay
against thousands, or even millions, of potential new drugs
within a small-molecule13 3 drug library"3 4 to identify compounds
that have activity in the assay. 135

Integra. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 24-26, Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. 193 (No. 031237).
133. "Small molecules" are molecular compounds that are usually composed of a few
atoms to several dozen atoms and are generally prepared (or capable of being prepared) by
synthetic organic chemists or pharmaceutical chemists. These are contrasted by large
molecules, such as proteins, DNA, and complex carbohydrates, which are composed of
thousands or millions of atoms.
134. Having a good drug library is critical to the drug discovery process. One might expect that drug discovery companies would have drug libraries numbering in the millions
or billions of compounds, but it costs a great deal of money to both make and screen a library of that size. Thus, drug libraries are carefully constructed to insure that the compounds contained in the library will yield the highest probability of succeeding in finding
an effective drug lead for the particular drug target. For example, the library should be
highly diverse and contain compounds which have many different types of functional
groups with a minimum of overlap. Simply having diversity in the library is not enough,
since some compounds would never proceed past clinical trials to become a new drug due
to toxicity or solubility problems. Other empirical tests, such as Lipinski's Rule of Five, see
Christopher A. Lipinski et al., Experimental and ComputationalApproaches to Estimate
Solubility and Permeability in Drug Discovery and Development Settings, 46 ADVANCED
DRUG DELIVERY REVIEWS 3 (2001), are helpful in predicting what molecules will make
good drugs.
135. One of the most important things to realize in drug discovery is that it is called
"drug discovery," and not drug design, construction, or engineering, for a reason. With only
a handful of exceptions, new drugs have always been discovered either accidentally or via
the "kitchen sink" method, which is throwing every available small molecule at a drug
target. It is virtually impossible to enter into drug discovery knowing what the best drug
will look like.
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The typically small number of active drug leads identified during lead discovery rarely go on to become the new drug used in
clinical trials, but the compounds identified serve as the starting
point for the third phase, lead optimization. Lead optimization
invariably is the slowest phase in drug research prior to clinical
trials. The lead compounds are analyzed by chemists and biologists in excruciating detail, looking for trends and similarities.
Based on this analysis, dozens or even hundreds of new compounds are proposed that could be even more effective than the
discovered leads. Because many of these proposed compounds
have only been dreamed of for the first time, however, the duty of
synthesizing them falls on the shoulders of medicinal chemists. A
delicate balance exists at this stage of development, with compounds being scrapped due to cost of synthesis, length of time required, or even the discovery of an existing patent covering the
proposed compound that would inhibit the chance of obtaining a
patent of its own should the compound prove to be the best drug
candidate. Once synthesized, these new compounds are screened
to determine if they exhibit improved activity, or activity at all.
Even compounds that fail may have some limited utility in this
stage because they may indicate what molecular features of the
compounds are detrimental to or required for efficacy.
During the process of lead optimization, the most promising
compounds are analyzed in other assays to ascertain other properties, such as mechanism of action (if unknown), pharmacokinetics, and pharmacology. These preclinical assays, in addition to efficacy assays, are important in determining whether a drug
candidate would be likely to be a safe and effective drug if taken
in humans. All of the information is analyzed and additional derivatives of the lead candidates are ordered. Ultimately, a single
compound is determined not only to be the most effective compound known at treating the disease, but also to possess all of the
desired properties that make it likely to be a successful drug in
humans.
The final stage of drug discovery occurs after the best drug
candidate is identified and begins with the filing of an IND application. At this point, the IND is filed with the FDA and includes
all of the preclinical information obtained by the drug company
that demonstrates the candidate is effective at treating the targeted disease and has a strong track record for safety. Once the
FDA is convinced of the safety of the drug and its probability of
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actually helping treat the targeted disease, the drug enters clinical trials, which is simply when the drug is tested in humans.
Stage I clinical trials involve a very small number of healthy
volunteers to determine whether the drug is safe for people to receive at all.' 36 Stage II clinical trials usually involve "testing in a
relatively small group of human volunteers with the disease or
condition being treated for initial efficacy and for establishing the
proper dose for the intended use of a new drug."1 37 Stage III, the
largest and most expensive of the stages, employs up to several
thousand patients and involves more long-term evaluation of the
drug and its effects on patients. 138 The tests in Stage III are randomized and employ controls. 139 Side effects are typically identified in this stage. Upon successfully completing Stage III by demonstrating the drug is effective and safe, the FDA approves the
use of the drug, allowing the drug company to market and sell the
new drug to the consumers. There is also a Stage IV clinical trial,
which involves post-marketing studies to monitor product
140
safety.
It is important to realize that although the Merck v. Integra
case involved the use of patented drugs by a third party, in general, drugmakers have no interest in research on patented drugs
because they are owned by someone else. Using patented or FDAapproved compounds in research has some benefits, namely
known methods of manufacture, modes of action, toxicity, pharmacokinetics, or other published properties, and the possibility
that known drugs might be useful for treating other conditions.
However, these compounds are either owned by someone else under a patent or have entered the public domain by the expiration
of a patent, making it difficult for pharmaceutical companies to
protect their research and development investment without the
possibility of patent protection. Thus, drug discovery is primarily
focused on finding compounds unknown in the literature and not
described or covered by existing patents.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See VOET, supra note 2, at 47.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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An excellent example of this notion can be found in BristolMyers Squibb v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer.14 ' Rhone-Poulenc owned a
patent on derivatives of Taxol, a powerful drug for combating
breast cancer.' 42 Bristol-Myers Squibb ("BMS") used the patented
derivatives in its research to develop its own cancer drugs. 143
Rhone-Poulenc moved for summary judgment against BMS, alleging that BMS's use of the patented compounds constituted infringement. 144 BMS raised § 271(e)(1) as an affirmative defense,
arguing the patented compounds were used as positive controls in
its research that ultimately led to submission of an NDA. 1 45 The
finding that the safe harbor exemption of § 271(e)(1) exempted
for the Supreme
BMS's infringing activity was a 1harbinger
46
Integra.
v.
Merck
in
decision
Court's
B. Impact of Merck v. Integra
The Supreme Court's decisions in Eli Lilly v. Medtronic and
Merck v. Integra clearly indicate the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption will be interpreted as broadly as the language of the
statute states. 147 The CAFC was cognizant of the ramifications
that such a broad reading would entail and unsuccessfully attempted to place limitations on the exemption. 148 Keeping in
mind Congress's intent to assist the development of generic
drugs,' 4 9 the CAFC erected a boundary for § 271(e)(1), holding
that it only applies to infringing activities that involve compounds determined to be submitted to the FDA for evaluation.'
Such an interpretation may have proved difficult to enforce without eviscerating the exemption. As the Court noted, the CAFC's
interpre-tation of the exemption would only be applicable when

141. No.95 Civ. 8833 (RPP), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001).
142. See id. at *3.
143. See id.
144. See id. at *1.
145. See id. at *4-5.
146. This case was not lost on Merck, who argued BMS several times in its brief to the
Supreme Court as persuasive authority that its actions should similarly be covered by
§ 271(e)(1). See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 31, 37, 42-43, Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 389070.
147. See Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. at 205-06; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496
U.S. 661, 665-67 (1990).
148. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
149. See id. at 865.
150. See id. at 867.
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the infringer knew the investigated drug would be submitted to
the FDA, which would effectively make the need for any experimentation moot.11 After all, if you already know how a drug will
perform, why would you need to test it?
Thus, the Court's decision correctly highlights the uncertainty
associated with drug discovery, as well as science in general, and
appropriately removes such an interpretation.'5 2 However, the
Supreme Court's decision in Merck v. Integra, coupled with the
"inelegant draftsmanship" of § 271(e)(1) 15" and the difficulties of
drug discovery, may have unintended consequences that will reverberate throughout the world of pharmaceutical and biotechnology.
Although the factual focus of Merck v. Integra involved the use
of patented drugs in experiments,1 4 the extent of acts of infringement excused by § 271(e)(1) is not so limited. 5 Along the
drug discovery process, there are many discoveries and inventions that may be patented, not just the final drug candidate, and
in today's research environment, it is virtually impossible for a
researcher to identify a drug candidate without using some patented invention they do not own. These other patented inventions
include the assay that can identify a drug target, the DNA sequence of a critical gene, or even the mechanical equipment (syringes, microscopes, etc.) used to conduct the experiments.' 5 6 In
fact, drug discovery within pharmaceutical companies would be
next to impossible without the important contributions of other
biotechnology companies or academic researchers. There are several reasonable definitions of "research tools" and many of these
inventions or discoveries can be called "research tools" because

151. See Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. at 206 ("One can know at the outset that a particular compound will be the subject of an eventual application to the FDA only if the active
ingredient in the drug being tested is identical to that in a drug that has already been approved.").
152. See id. ("[I]t disregards the reality that, even at late stages in the development of a
new drug, scientific testing is a process of trial and error.").
153. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990).
154. Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. at 208 ("We thus agree . . . that the use of patented
compounds in preclinical studies is protected under § 271(e)(1) ... ").
155. Id. at 202 ("[W]e think it apparent from the statutory text that § 271(e)(1)'s exemption from infringement extends to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably
related to the development and submission of any information under the FDCA.").
156. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing patented inventions to
be used in research).
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they assist scientists in their research. In Integra v. Merck, the
CAFC concluded its majority opinion by briefly discussing the
importance of "research tools," stating:
The value to a licensee of research tools lies, in part, in the point at
which those tools are employed in the drug development continuum.
A research tool enabling the identification of a drug candidate during high throughput screening, for instance, may supply more value
to the ultimate invention than a research tool used to confirm an already recognized drug candidate's safety or efficacy. 157

One could construe "research tools" exceedingly broadly to be
"something used in performing an operation or necessary in the
practice" 5 ' of "investigation or experimentation aimed at the discovery and interpretation of facts."15
Although some may advocate for a specific protection of socalled "research tools," such protection could defeat the entire
purpose of Congress's intent to facilitate the production of generic
drugs. For example, in her dissent, Judge Newman chose to narrow the definition of "research tools" to "a product or method
whose purpose is use in the conduct of research."16 ° In this manner, the RGD peptides, invented for the purpose of being used as
a therapeutic, would not qualify as a "research tool," even though
they were used to facilitate Dr. Cheresh's research. 6 1 This is a
perfectly appropriate definition, but its application in a legal
sense could be very difficult, because the question of who gets to
determine the primary function of an invention is left unanswered.'6 2 Under Judge Newman's view,' 3 the intelligent inventor would declare every invention to have a primary purpose as a
research tool, even if the only research it could be used for would
be for the development of an improvement of the patented inven157. Id. at 871 (majority opinion).
158. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 38, at 1243 (tool).
159. Id. at 995 (research).
160. Integra v. Merck, 331 F.3d at 878 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (emphasis added).
161. See id. at 863 (majority opinion).
162. See Kenneth J. Burchfield, Merck KGaA v. Integra: More Answers Than Questions?, 6 J. HIGH TECH. 79, 90 (2005) ("Unlike a microscope, a chemical compound does not
have a single, easily defined utility as a 'research tool.' A microscope can be used to study
diseases, but not to treat them. A chemical compound, such as a phenolphthalein dye, may
be useful both as a pH indicator in laboratory research, and as a therapeutic agent for
treatment of constipation.").
163. See Integra v. Merck, 331 F.3d at 878 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tion itself. If this were true, a drugmaker could thwart even the
congressionally intended purpose of § 271(e)(1), i.e. to overrule
Roche v. Bolar,16 4 by declaring the drugs to be research tools first
and therapeutic agents second. Thus, a generic drug company
could not use the patented drug without permission from the patent owner, artificially extending the drug's effective patent life,
while the patent holder would remain free to market the drug absent generic competition.
The real threat to the biotechnological and pharmaceutical industry posed by § 271(e)(1) is the freedom of a drug researcher to
infringe any patented invention, including the assays and methods commonly used to develop information pertinent to submission of an IND to the FDA, not just the right to use patented
compounds in research. 165 Drugmakers are rarely interested in
developing new uses for known compounds because patents cannot protect new uses. Researchers, however, identify new drug
candidates using assays that "cause the sort of physiological effect the researcher intends to induce,"166 as well as other assays
designed to measure the compound's pharmacological, toxicological, pharmacokinetic, and metabolic properties, all of which generate information relevant to submission of an IND.' 7 More importantly, most of these assays are likely to be patented by
someone other than the drug researcher, which means that in the
absence of § 271(e)(1), the researcher must obtain a license to use
the patented assay or risk expensive infringement litigation.
However, based upon the Supreme Court's repeated holding regarding the safe harbor exemption that it excuses infringement
from "all patented inventions, " 168 it is critical to identify at what

164. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharms. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
165. Although the law indicates that all patented inventions may be used free from infringement, there are many inventions that would not be likely to be infringed by drug
researchers. "Even a large multinational drug maker is unlikely to take up the manufacture of centrifuges, DNA sequencers, fluorescently labeled monoclonal antibodies, or any
other product that would be more cheaply and easily obtained by simple purchase even at
high price points." O'Malley, supra note 82, at 756.
166. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005).
167. See id. at 203.
168. See id. at 202 ("§ 271(e)(1)'s exemption from infringement extends to all uses of
patented inventions ...
"); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990)
("The phrase 'patented invention' in § 271(e)(1) is defined to include all inventions, not
drug-related inventions alone."); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulene Rorer, Inc.,
No. 95 Civ. 8833, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361, at (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001) ("Nothing in
the text of Section 271(e)(1) indicates that Congress intended to restrict the scope of the
term 'patented invention' to those products covered by Section 156.").
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stage the § 271(e)(1) exemption begins. Once exempt, a drug
maker should no69longer be required to obtain a license to use a
patented assay. 1
The Supreme Court, in Merck v. Integra, provided a two-prong
test indicating when the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption will
not apply:
Basic scientific research on a particular compound, performed without the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief that
the compound will cause the sort of physiological effect the researcher intends to induce, is surely not "reasonably related to the
development and submission of information" to the FDA. 170

While this test indicates when the exemption will not apply, it
suggests that if either, or both, of the requirements are present,
§ 271(e)(1) will excuse all acts of infringement. In Merck v. Integra, the test provided the foundation of the holding by merely
substituting "a particular compound" with "a patented compound." 171 The Court, however, neglected to decide whether §
271(e)(1) would cover acts of infringement by a researcher who
has "the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief
that the compound will cause the sort of physiological effect the
researcher intends to induce," but not both. 172
The use of the phrase "at least" defines the ambiguity in the
Supreme Court's ruling. 173 By employing this expression, the
Court suggested that the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption may
begin some time before a researcher has a "reasonable basis for
believing that a patented compound may work, through a particular biological process, to produce a particular physiological effect"
and generates data suitable for FDA submission. 174 Based on this
definition, it can be strongly argued that the safe harbor line at

169.

See Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. at 202 ("§ 271(e)(1)'s exemption from infringement

extends to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development
and submission of any information under the FDCA.").
170.

Id. at 205-06.

171. See id. at 206-07 ("At least where a drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing that a patented compound may work, through a particular biological process, to produce a particular physiological effect, and uses the compound in research that, if successful, would be appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA, that use is 'reasonably
related' to the 'development and submission of information under ...Federal law.'" (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
172. Id. at 206.
173. Id. at 207.
174.

Id.
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least begins at the lead optimization stage, when a drugmaker
would have both the intent to make a drug and a reasonable belief that the compounds analyzed would act in the desired man175
ner.
This conclusion is also supported by the requirement to include
"similar compounds" in the preclinical data submitted to the FDA
in order to assist the agency in predicting the safety of the drug
candidate.1 7 6 What constitutes "similar" is not defined, but such a
definition would be readily interpreted by medicinal chemists to
include compounds structurally related. It should be cautioned
that establishing a rigid legal rule for what is "similar" would be
inadvisable, and each situation should be examined on a case-bycase basis. An analogy can be drawn to the obviousness standard
of 35 U.S.C. § 103 in patent law, 177 which, for chemical species, is
determined by reference to whether an expert in the field would
have "the motivation to make the [similar] compositions in the
expectation that they would have similar properties" to the drug
candidate. 178
An excellent case that highlights the difference between obviousness and what would constitute the development of "similar
compounds" during lead optimization is embodied in Yamanouchi
Pharmaceuticals v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc.17 9 Danbury attempt-ed to invalidate Yamanouchi's patent for famotidine, marketed by Merck as Pepcid.18 0 Danbury argued that a person having ordinary skill in the art, upon examining two compounds
listed in separate Yamonouchi patents, both known to have properties similar to famotidine, would have found it obvious to mixand-match functional groups from both molecules to arrive at the

175. See Benjamin G. Jackson, Comment, Merck v. Integra: Bailing Water Without
Plugging the Hole, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 579, 592-93 (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court's
acceptance of similar compounds investigated during the lead optimization stage).
176. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 19, Merck v.
Integra, 545 U.S. 193 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 429972 (citing 21 C.F.R. 312.23(a)(5)(v) ("[a]
description of possible risks and side effects to be anticipated on the basis of prior experience with the drug under investigation or with related drugs.") (alteration in original)).
177. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
178. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 693 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Although the chemical obviousness standard is listed here as an analogy, the standards set for drug discovery for what
qualifies as a "similar compound" should be less stringent than the standards for obviousness. This is because in lead optimization, creativity and ingenuity are highly valued when
identifying hypothetical compounds to test for desired activity.
179. 231 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
180. See id. at 1341-42.
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structure of famotidine. 181 The CAFC correctly rejected this argument, stating that it would not have been obvious to the typical
chemist in the field to arrive at famotidine's structure based on
the rather unrelated structures in the other patents, but instead,
would have required a significant amount of hindsight to achieve
such a combination."8 2 It is not inconceivable, however, that the
structure of famotidine could be arrived at during lead optimization, especially using the reasonable (yet nonobvious) rationale
proposed by Danbury.183 Although the structure of famotidine
might not have been obvious based on the disclosure found in the
prior art at the time of the filing of the patent application, the
reference compounds mentioned by Danbury should readily qualify as "similar compounds" to be included in the submission of
famotidine to the FDA in an IND.
The holding in Merck v. Integra left two questions unanswered
about drug discovery and the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption.' 8 4
The first question is whether a researcher using patented compounds or screens would be exempt from infringement if the researcher has a reasonable belief that that the compound will
cause the intended effect, but lacks the specific intent to develop
a drug. 185 The language of § 271(e)(1) suggests that the safe har-

181. See id. at 1343-44.
182. See id. at 1345 ("Danbury falls far short of satisfying its burden of showing a
prima facie case for structural obviousness by clear and convincing evidence. Instead, as
the district court aptly concluded, this case 'has all the earmarks of somebody looking at
this from hindsight.'" (quoting Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 21 F.
Supp. 2d 366, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1998))).
183. See id. at 1343-44.
184. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 205-06 (2005) ("Basic scientific research on a particular compound, performed without the intent to develop a
particular drug or a reasonable belief that the compound will cause the sort of physiological effect the researcher intends to induce, is surely not 'reasonably related to the development and submission of information' to the FDA." (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
(2000))).
185. Typical researchers falling into this category would include professors at universities investigating the underlying biochemical or cellular mechanisms for a given condition
or disease, although the discoveries from this research might ultimately lead to new drug
discoveries. Under the common law, this type of academic research would have been protected by the experimental use doctrine, see Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 93-94, first described in the opinion written by Supreme Court Justice Story for Whittemore v. Cutter, 29
F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. May 1813) (No. 17,600) ("[lIt could never have been the
intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for
philosophical experiments . . . ."). However, the experimental use doctrine was severely
restricted in Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), limiting the doctrine to non-commercial activities solely "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
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bor exemption would not be applicable to acts of infringement
without the intent to develop a drug simply because the types of
experiments that generate information related to submission to
the FDA are generally not conducted outside the typical drug discovery process. Perhaps a situation that would qualify for the
§ 271(e)(1) safe harbor without an intent to develop a drug would
occur during the course of development of an assay designed to
evaluate preclinical properties of drugs, such as an assay that determines pharmacology or toxicology of drugs." 6 The patented
drugs would be used in the assay to validate that the new assay
correctly reproduces the pharmacology or toxicology information
previously produced in similar assays. In such an example, use of
a patented drug in the assay under development would probably
not be infringing because its use is "reasonably related to the development and submission of information under Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products."1 7
The more valuable and legally interesting question left unanswered in Merck v. Integra is whether the mere "intent to develop
a particular drug"' is sufficient to excuse acts of infringement in
pursuit of the "submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs ... ."1189
This situation corresponds to the lead discovery stage of the drug
discovery process, where a drugmaker has the intent to discover a
new drug but lacks the "reasonable belief that the compound will
.cause the sort of physiological effect the researcher intends to induce." 9 ° The importance of this question cannot be understated,
because if there is a finding that acts of infringement during lead
strictly philosophical inquiry."' Id. at 1362 (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering
Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Even though the interests of the professor are
merely for academic, non-profit pursuits, the holding in Madey suggests that the benefits
of the research enjoyed by the university employing the professor would exempt acts of
infringement from the experimental use doctrine.
186. See Burchfiel, supra note 162, at 84-85 (discussing the fact that some animal models and other assays "have no other utility" outside drug discovery).
187. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
188. Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. at 206.
189. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
190. Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. at 206; see Daniel J. O'Connor & Tamsen Valoir, The
Supreme Court Tilts Toward Drug Developers: Drug Discovery After Merck v. Integra, 5
CI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 124, 138 (2006) ("Drug companies can be relieved that any experiments conducted after 'lead' identification appear to be exempt from infringement, so
long as they can be shown to be related to the submission of information to the FDA. This
includes both clinical and pre-clinical testing.").
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discovery are protected by § 271(e)(1), then every step of the drug
discovery process would be protected by the safe harbor exemption, including experiments intended to determine the efficacy,
pharmacology, toxicology, and pharmacokinetics of the compounds studied. This would include not only simple in vitro or
cell-based assays, but patented animal studies as well. Because so
much of drug discovery occurs using patented technologies, drug
researchers would no longer be required to compensate scientific
innovators who develop the tools required to conduct research.
C. The Debate Rages On...
Numerous discussions focus on the question of whether the
§ 271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption provides a defense for patent
infringement at the lead discovery stage. At this stage, drugmakers are searching for a compound that will eventually lead to a
new drug but have little or no information as to which compound
the new drug will resemble out of the thousands or even millions
of compounds initially screened for activity. 191 Until the Supreme
Court or the CAFC weigh in on the issue, it will remain unclear
whether the safe harbor will be strictly limited to the lead optimization stage delineated in Merck v. Integra or if it will extend to
prior arts on the drug discovery roadmap.
There are many opposed to allowing the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor
to extend beyond what Congress originally intended. The American Intellectual Property Law Association ("AIPLA") argued in its
amicus brief that lead discovery, including automated discovery,
so-called high-throughput screening, should not be within the
safe harbor exemption.19 2 O'Connor and Valoir suggest that the
Supreme Court's agreement with the amicus brief for the United
States may indicate the Court will later agree with the Government's position that screening is an activity that should also be
exempt from infringement.193 Burchfiel questioned whether intent alone was sufficient to exempt the use "of thousands of patented compounds screened in an assay to discover pharmacologi-

191. See Burchfiel, supra note 162, at 88-89.
192. Brief of the American Intellectual Property Law Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 20, Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL
435890.
193. O'Connor and Valoir, supra note 190, at 138.
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cal activity."19 4 Furthermore, at least one major player in the biotech community interpreted the Merck v. Integra ruling to mean
that the exemption did not extend to cover so-called "research
tools."1 9 But this announcement is most likely premature, because the Supreme Court's declaration of having no opinion on
research tools is far from a ruling in favor of protecting such tools.
The CAFC eloquently noted, however, some protection for patents
critical to research will be required to protect the biotech industry's intellectual property at all stages of drug discovery. 196
Although the decision to exempt acts of infringement under
§ 271(e)(1) during the lead discovery phase of drug development
remains a close legal question, infringing activities during lead
discovery may not fall under the safe harbor exemption because,
as a whole, they are not 'reasonably related to the development
and submission of information' to the FDA." 19 7 The Court appropriately defined the limits of the exemption when it stated, "Properly construed, § 271(e)(1) leaves adequate space for experimentation and failure on the road to regulatory approval." 198 During
lead discovery, a million compounds could be screened for their
ability to induce "the sort of physiological effect the researcher intends to induce,"'9 9 yet out of those million compounds, only a few
dozen compounds are likely to show any such activity. As the Supreme Court stated in Merck v. Integra, "There is simply no room
in the statute for excluding certain information from the exemption on the basis of the phase of research in which it is developed
or the particular submission in which it could be included."20 0
The Supreme Court did not "quibble" with the CAFC's conclusion that the § 271(e)(1) exemption "does not globally embrace all
experimental activity that at some point, however attenuated,

194. Burchfiel, supra note 162, at 88.
195. Press Release, Invitrogen Corp., U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Merck KGaA v.
Integra LifeSciences Leaves Research Tool Patents Unaffected (June 14, 2005), available
at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=61498&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=720161&hig
hlight=.
196. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("[E]xpansion of § 271(e)(1) to include the Scripps Merck activities would effectively vitiate
the exclusive rights of patentees owning biotechnology tool patents.").
197. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
198. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193,207 (2005).
199. Id. at 206.
200. Id. at 202.
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may lead to an FDA approval process." '' Even if a successful
screen identified 100 active compounds, it is difficult to argue
that the entire experiment, one that produces an anticipated failure rate of more than 99.9%, is "'reasonably related to the development and submission of information' to the FDA." 21 2 It is true
that out of those initial millions of compounds, a few compounds
might arise that form the basis for the discovery of the drug candidate forwarded to the FDA. The researchers at the lead discovery stage, however, lack sufficient information to form a reasonable or rational basis to expect that any of the compounds in a
library will demonstrate activity. 203 Furthermore, even if it can be
argued that the handful of compounds identified by the screen to
possess activity are protected by § 271(e)(1) because they are reasonably related to the drug ultimately submitted to the FDA, the
researcher will still have almost a million acts of infringing a patented assay that are not protected by the safe harbor.
Such an argument, however, is subject to the same criticisms of
the CAFC opinion that attempted to judicially create a limit to
§ 271(e)(1), when one arguably does not exist within the statute. 20 4 The CAFC, recognizing the far reaching effects a broad interpretation of § 271(e)(1) will carry, attempted to limit the exemption to only compounds that will be submitted to the FDA for
analysis.2 5 While the CAFC may have been correct to apply Congressional intent,2 0 6 the Supreme Court chose instead to rely

201. Id. at 205 (quoting Integra v. Merck, 331 F.3d at 867).
202. Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. at 206 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (emphasis
added)).
203. This argument is very similar to that proffered by the CAFC in rejecting §
271(e)(1) protection for Dr. Cheresh's acts of infringement upon Integra's patents. However, in that situation, the RGD peptides were a known starting point for activity from
which Merck optimized to find analogs that were simultaneously more active and not
claimed by Integra's patents. Every one of the compounds tested by Merck had some activity in the angiogenesis assay and had the potential to be a drug. During lead discovery, a
researcher does not have such a starting point or frame of reference. This situation is more
aptly described by the words of the CAFC when it wrote that the "experiments did not
supply information for submission to the [FDA], but instead identified the best drug candidate to subject to future clinical testing under the FDA processes." Integra v. Merck, 331
F.3d at 865.
204. See Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. at 206 ("Thus, to construe § 271(e)(1), as the Court
of Appeals did, not to protect research conducted on patented compounds for which an IND
is not ultimately filed is effectively to limit assurance of exemption to the activities necessary to seek approval of a generic drug...
205. See id.
206. Integra v. Merck, 331 F.3d at 865 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. II, at 8 (1984),
reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2692).
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upon the language of the statute to define the boundaries of the
exemption. 207
Until the Supreme Court or the CAFC weigh in on the issue, it
will remain unclear whether the safe harbor will be strictly limited to the lead optimization stage delineated in Merck v. Integra
or if it will extend to prior acts on the drug discovery roadmap. If
the courts adhere to the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of
§ 271(e)(1), 2°1 the exemption could be extended to all levels of
drug research if the activities conducted are necessary to develop
a drug candidate. Such an interpretation would come at a great
cost to the industry, and a judicial or legislative clarification is
direly needed.
D. Do We Care if Lead Discovery is Protected by § 271(e)(1)?
In its amicus brief, the Government warned that until the
scope of infringement protection under § 271(e)(1) is decided, drug
researchers will be fearful of infringing any patents, and instead
will be inclined to enter into licensing agreements with patentees
to avoid a potentially costly adverse finding of infringement. °9
The decision in Merck v. Integra, however, indicates that the safe
harbor protects acts of infringement at the lead optimization
stage, and the only real question is whether it extends to the lead
discovery stage. Based on the CAFC decision in Bayer A.G. v.
Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,210 a drugmaker will probably be
justified in infringing patents at the lead discovery stage if the
predicted revenues of the drug candidate, identified by the act of
infringement, greatly exceed the cost of infringing the assay patent.

207. As the Court noted in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990),
"[n]o interpretation we have been able to imagine can transform § 271(e)(1) into an elegant
piece of statutory draftsmanship."
208. See Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. at 202 ("§ 271(e)(1)'s exemption from infringement
extends to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development
and submission of any information under the FDCA.").
209. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Merck v.
Integra, 545 U.S. 193 (No. 03-1237) 2005 WL 929972 ("In particular, the exemption cannot
be limited to studies that, in retrospect, appear to have been strictly 'necessary' to obtain
FDA approval ....Especially in light of the in terrorem effect of potential treble damages
awards, that approach would unacceptably chill new drug development by preventing researchers from ascertaining in advance whether their activities were protected by the exemption." (citations omitted)).
210. 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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Recently, patentees in the biotech industry adopted the legal
stance that if a drug was identified using patented methods,
processes, or other tools, the patentees of the utilized inventions
were entitled to a portion of the profits of the drug under a
"reach-through" royalty scheme. 21 ' The foundation for reachthrough licensing stemmed from the legal position that information derived from patented processes, such as identifying a drug
lead target from a patented assay, was a product of the patented
process, subject to injunctive relief and royalties against the
product of infringement, namely the identity of the drug target
and its subsequent sales revenue. Such a position gave the developers of tools necessary to the drug discovery process leverage in
discouraging infringement of such patents, especially in light of
the hundreds of millions, or even billions, of revenue dollars at
stake in modern pharmaceuticals and the threat of triple damage
awards for a finding of willful infringement.2 1 2
The playing field was leveled in Bayer v. Housey. The CAFC's
decision strongly suggested that such "reach-through" royalties
are not a component of the monopoly enjoyed by a patentee.2" 3
Housey owned several patents on a "Method of Screening for Protein Inhibitors and Activators."21 4 Bayer allegedly infringed the
patents by using the patented methods on foreign soil to uncover
a new drug candidate and importing the information-which was
embodied by an identified drug target and obtained by utilizing
the patented method. 21 5 Housey sued for infringement under
§ 271(g), which prohibits the importation, sale, or use of a product
made in another country "by a process patented in the United
States,"21 6 and alleged it was entitled to reach-through royalties.2 17 The district court found that § 271(g) applied only to prod-

211. See John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool
Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY 285, 297 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
212. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-29 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
213. See Bayer v. Housey, 340 F.3d at 1378 ("A drug product, the characteristics of
which were studied using the claimed research processes, therefore, is not a not a product
made by' those claimed processes.").
214. U.S. Patent Nos. 5,877,007 (filed June 7, 1995), 5,688,655 (filed Mar. 17, 1995),
5,266,464 (filed Aug. 10, 1989), 4,980,281 (filed Feb. 10, 1988); see Bayer v. Housey, 340
F.3d at 1368-69 & n.1.
215. See Bayer v. Housey, 340 F.3d at 1370.
216. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000).
217. See Bayer v. Housey, 340 F.3d at 1370.
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ucts of patented manufacturing processes, not information derived using patented methods, and dismissed Housey's claim.2 18
On appeal, the CAFC affirmed the district court's holding that
§ 271(g) is inapplicable to information gathered under a patented
process or method. The CAFC held that production of the drug by
Bayer did not infringe Housey's patent because the patent had no
relation to the manufacturing of the drug. 219 The CAFC noted
that "[a] drug product, the characteristics of which were studied
using the claimed research processes, therefore, is not a product
'made by' those claimed processes."2 2 °
The ruling in Bayer v. Housey sent a strong message to the biotech community that "reach-through" royalties are almost certainly not enforceable. 22 ' If the information derived from the assay, namely, the most effective drug candidate, is not a product of
the patented method used to identify it, then the patent will have
no legal authority over the manufacturing and sales of the approved drug. 222 This decision, however, does not leave the patentee of a research tool without the power to sue for infringement. It simply limits the liability of the infringing acts of the
drug researcher to the infringement of the methods, processes, or
tools under § 271(a).2 23 Furthermore, it seems clear that if the infringing drug research occurred upon foreign soil, the patentee is
left with nothing, because § 271(a) does not apply to infringing
acts that are not "within the United States," 224 and § 271(g) does
not prevent importation of information derived from infringement

218. See Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d. 328, 330 (D. Del. 2001)
("Upon a plain reading of the statute, the court finds that Section 271(g) addresses only
products derived from patented manufacturingprocesses, i.e., methods of actually making
or creating a product as opposed to methods of gathering information about, or identifying,
a substance worthy of further development." (afld, 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
219. See Bayer v. Housey, 340 F.3d at 1377.
220. Id. at 1377-78 (referring to 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), which states, "[w]hoever without
authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United
States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable
as an infringer. .. ." 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000) (emphasis added)).
221. See id. at 1378.
222. "'[Plrocesses of identification and generation of data are not steps in the manufacture of a final drug product.'" Id. at 1377 (quoting Bayer v. Housey, 169 F. Supp. 2d at
331).
223. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor[e], infringes the patent.").
224. Id.
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of the patented method conducted on foreign soil. 225 As one major
law firm suggested, patentees of research tools may have to think
twice if they believe their patents will give them a piece of the
multibillion dollar pot of gold at the end of the drug discovery
process, or the right to an injunction to stop production of the
drug-"such
actions are not part of the ongoing manufacture of
226
the drug."
Without the threat of reach-through royalties, the decision in
Bayer v. Housey creates a balancing test for drug researchers
faced with the decision to either license a patented invention required to identify the next drug candidate or infringe the patents
in the hope that § 271(e)(1) will protect them from litigation.
When faced with the question of whether the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor will cover the use of another's patented assay, process, or
other invention, the prudent researcher will likely proceed with
infringement. Under the best possible scenario, the exemption
will indemnify the infringement because the actions are "reasonably related to the development and submission of information
under a Federal law."2 27 The researcher, therefore, will not be liable for any compensation to the patentee. Under the worst possible scenario, the exemption will not apply, and researchers
would be open to infringement liabilities equal to the value of the
assay infringed, at most. Even if in the millions of dollars, this
would be paltry next to the potentially billions of dollars in revenue generated by the next blockbuster drug if the research was
successful.
V. CONCLUSION

The current literature indicates the failure of the legislature
and judiciary to adequately define significant terms regarding the
§ 271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption has resulted in a governmen-

225. See Bayer v. Housey, 340 F.3d at 1378. As Burchfiel points out, Merck selected this
option. See Burchfiel, supra note 162, at 90 ("[Elarly drug discovery research will be exported to avoid infringement. Merck KGaA avoided this problem by conducting its preliminary screening in Germany....").
226. Pillsbury Winthrop, LLP, Client Alert: Patent Infringement and "Reach-Through"
Royalty Claims on Pharmaceutical Products Discovered Using Patented Tools: New Decision Weighs Against Such Claims, (Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://www.pillsburylaw.
com/content/portallpubicatins/2004//00006236Client%20Alert%2Bitech%2Life%20
Science%20M%20Mehok%2001-28-04.pdf.
227. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
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tally fashioned state of confusion. Within the arena of drug discovery and biotechnology there is no precise determination of
where infringement stops and exemption begins. With a fundamental understanding of the general process of drug discovery
and development, however, the holdings in both Merck v. Integra
and Eli Lilly v. Medtronic indicate pharmaceutical companies can
infringe upon any patent they wish, once they reach the required
stage of drug recovery, without the need to enter licensing agreements or fear infringement litigation. Although it is clear that
§ 271(e)(1) excuses infringement during lead optimization, it remains to be seen whether the initial steps of lead discovery will
enjoy similar protection. The decision in Bayer v. Housey suggests
that the liability faced by a researcher for a finding of infringement may be relatively minor with respect to the possibility of bil228
lions of dollars in profit generated by a successful new drug.
A solution to the current problem is not as difficult as some
have suggested. 22 9 Many of the ambiguities present in the language of § 271(e)(1) can simply be corrected by making the
exemption specific only to the development of generic drugs as
Congress intended.2 3 ° For example, excising the words "a Federal
law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs" from
§ 271(e)(1) 231 and substituting the "Abbreviated New Drug Application" under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). 232 This change would bring
§ 271(e)(1) in line with § 271(e)(2), which explicitly names the
ANDA statute.2 33 In addition, the change would eliminate the
confusion created by Merck v. Integra, limit the exemption to generic drugs as Congress originally planned, and restore the rights

228. See Bayer v. Housey, 340 F.3d at 1378.
229. Many different theories for correcting § 271(e)(1) have been posited. Judge Pauline
Newman has suggested creating an exception to the exemption for patents nebulously defined as "research tools." Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 877-78
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Brendon O'Malley
suggests against reliance on "appropriate pricing of research tools for initial purchase...
help[ing] research toolmakers to compensate for lost licensing revenues," since some technologies are more easily pirated than others. O'Malley, supra note 82, at 756-58. Instead,
he advocates changes such as "a patented invention itself under study for future regulatory
approval" or "'as part of a clinical trial reasonably related." Id.
230. See Integra v. Merck, 331 F.3d at 865. ("The House Committee ... described the
pre-market approval activity as 'a limited amount of testing so that generic manufacturers
can establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute.'" (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt.
II., at 8, (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2692)).
231. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
232. 35 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000).
233. 21 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
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of patent owners for methods, processes, and tools involved in
drug research.
Infringers would still be able to conduct the patented inventions on foreign soil without fear of litigation under § 271(g) as interpreted by Bayer v. Housey. 234 A law that limits the importation
of information into the country, or an amendment to § 271(g) in a
similar fashion, would have to be carefully constructed and most
likely would produce endless litigation over what constitutes "information" derived from using methods or assays in foreign countries patented within the United States. 23 5 The simplest solution
would be for inventors to patent their inventions in foreign countries as well as the United States to discourage foreign infringement, a strategy more companies are choosing due to the globalization of scientific research. 236 Although the prosecution of
patents all over the globe may prove too costly for some inventors,
such measures may simply be the cost of scientific development in
today's world.
The recent interpretations of § 271(e)(1) represent a significant
challenge to pharmaceutical, biotechnological, and even academic
research fields. The foundation of drug discovery rests upon the
identification of new drug targets, methods to identify active
compounds, and ways to establish the efficacy and safety of the
drugs of tomorrow. While the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor was created
with the greatest of intentions, its applicability has greatly expanded beyond Congress's intent to facilitate the development of
generic drugs. In the absence of a congressional resolution, the
broad language will continue to erode the enforceability and value
of tools in the field.2 37 This could lead to a decrease in the venture

234. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("A drug
product, the characteristics of which were studied using the claimed research processes,
therefore, is not a product 'made by' those claimed processes.").
235. See id. at 1376 ("The importation of information in the abstract. . . cannot be easily controlled. As Bayer points out, a person possessing the allegedly infringing information could, under Housey's interpretation, possibly infringe by merely entering the country.").
236. The CAFC has ruled that the existence of the right to foreign patents has no bearing upon its construction of the right of domestic patentees. See AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft
Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1370 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("Obtaining foreign patents would surely
alleviate some avoidance of American law, but we must construe our statutes irrespective
of the existence or nonexistence of foreign patents.").
237. O'Malley suggests a parallel between the loss of enforceability in biotech patents
and the challenge faced by the music and movie industries due to rampant copying and
other unauthorized use. See O'Malley, supra note 82, at 757.
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capital needed to fund the myriad of startup biotech companies
whose only assets are the intellectual property embodied in the
same patents drug makers may infringe without fear. Without
the development of new tools, the entire pharmaceutical industry
may face a dearth of new developments that could ultimately lead
to its collapse. Congress should act as soon as possible before the
damage to the drug discovery infrastructure becomes irreparable.
Paul T. Nyffeler

